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ABSTRACT 
 
The cost of clinical negligence litigation is rising year on year. In this era of austerity, 
a response is critical. In 2011 an NHS Redress Act scheme was introduced in Wales 
which will align procedures for complaints and restoration. A Scottish No Fault 
Compensation Review Group recommended in 2011 that tort based liability is 
abandoned. In England options are limited by virtue of the size and complexity of the 
NHS. The Government have proposed reform of civil litigation costs which will 
reduce the legal costs for the NHS by around a third, but the Health Committee 
issued a report in June 2011 warning that ‘preservation of access to justice will be 
the yardstick by which these proposals will be judged’. In 2003 the Chief Medical 
Officer (CMO) showed that civil litigation costs reform alone would not adequately 
balance procedural and substantive justice. A tort based, fast track, low value clinical 
negligence scheme was proposed. The NHS Redress Act 2006 enabled a scheme to 
be implemented but England failed to act. Meanwhile reforms of the complaints 
process, professional and institutional regulation and legal requirements of openness 
attempted to improve NHS redress. This paper considers firstly whether the NHS 
reforms combined with the civil litigation costs reforms address the CMOs concerns 
over clinical negligence litigation. Secondly, I consider two proposed fast track 
schemes – Lord Justice Jackson favours an NHS Redress Act scheme, and Lord 
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Young favours an extension of the fast track Road Traffic Act (RTA) Personal Injury 
scheme implemented in 2010.  I compare the two with each other and with the 
schemes proposed in Wales and Scotland. The English fast track schemes pose 
advantages over civil litigation cost reform alone, but fall significantly short of the 
CMO’s 2003 recommendations.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Claims against the NHS are rising. In 2009/10, the National Health Service Litigation 
Authority (NHSLA) received 6,652 claims for clinical negligence - over 500 more than 
the year before. 1 As we shall see, the Government have published plans to address 
both the rising number of claims and their cost to defendants, such as the NHS. Why 
do patients sue? Bismark and Dauer suggest that there are four motivations to 
medico-legal action:  
[R]estoration, including financial compensation or some other intervention to 
‘make the patient whole again’, correction, such as a system change or 
competence review to protect future patients; communication, which may 
include an explanation, expression of responsibility, or apology; and sanction, 
including professional discipline or some other form of punitive action.2 
In this paper the term ‘redress’ refers to the combined goals of restoration, 
correction, communication and sanction. Aggrieved patients seek redress, which 
                                                          
*With grateful thanks to Professor Ken Oliphant for his comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining 
errors are my own. 
1
 See National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 
(London, 2010). 
2
 M. Bismark, E. Dauer, “Motivations for Medico-Legal Action – Lessons From New Zealand” (2006) 
27 The Journal of Legal Medicine 55. 
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goes beyond mere financial compensation.3  The NHS and professional bodies 
implement complaints procedures and operate systems designed to prevent the 
repetition of mistakes. A lack of openness amongst the medical profession 
perpetuated by the clinical negligence litigation process has an adverse impact on 
the effectiveness of measures designed to communicate and correct. By 
implementing a ‘joined-up’ system of redress the success of each individual measure 
is enhanced.  
The Government have proposed reforms which aim to bring about a less 
litigious society and more affordable justice.4 The controversial5 proposals focus 
broadly on civil litigation funding6 and administration of justice7, but will inevitably 
effect considerable change on clinical negligence litigation, not least by reducing the 
costs incumbent on the NHS. It is important, therefore, to assess how far the reforms 
will impact on the related agenda of improving redress in the NHS. In the first part of 
the paper, I consider how the Government’s funding reform proposals together with 
other measures designed to improve redress in recent years respond to the 
criticisms of the clinical negligence system made by the Chief Medical Officer in 
2003. I will show that, despite progress in improving various aspects of NHS redress, 
the clinical negligence litigation system perpetuates injustice for both patients and 
                                                          
3
 See A.-M. Farrell, S. Devaney and A. Dar, Interim Report to the No Fault Compensation Review 
Group, Scotland, “Literature review – No Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review” 
(28 January 2010). 
4
 Ministry of Justice, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Quicker, Simpler and More 
Proportionate System Consultation Paper CP6/2011, p. 6. 
5
 Working Group on Civil Litigation Costs (chaired by Ken Oliphant), On a Slippery Slope - A 
Response to the Jackson Report (2011), accessible at http://ectil.org/oliphant/slippery-slope/ and 
discussed below. 
6
 Ministry of Justice, Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales: 
Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Proposals CP 13/10, November 2010; Ministry of Justice, 
Reforming Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales – Implementation of Lord Justice 
Jackson’s Recommendations: The Government’s Response Cm 8041, March 2011; Ministry of 
Justice, Legal Aid Reform in England and Wales; the Government Response, Cm 8072, June 2011. 
7
 Solving Disputes in the County Courts, see note 4 above. 
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healthcare professionals. Furthermore, it impacts adversely on other means of 
achieving redress, such as complaints procedures.  
In the second part of the paper I consider two proposals for fast track low 
value clinical negligence schemes. Lord Justice Jackson proposed that the 
abandoned NHS Redress Act 2006 is resurrected;8 Lord Young proposed that the 
Road Traffic Act fast track scheme is extended to clinical negligence claims.9 Both 
offer considerable advantages over civil cost reform alone. Neither option addresses 
or ‘joins up’ the various aspects of redress to the extent that is likely to be achieved 
in Wales and Scotland, or satisfies the requirements for ‘just redress’ set down by 
the CMO.  
Because I concentrate on the linkage between the various elements of redress, I 
cover an ambitiously large area for a short article. I will therefore pick out only the 
most important aspects of the recent reforms and proposals. 
A. IS  NHS REDRESS FIT FOR PURPOSE? 
 
1. MAKING AMENDS 
 
In Making Amends,10  Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer addressed the 
various aims of redress in his proposals to reform clinical negligence in the NHS. Sir 
Donaldson complained that: 
– it is complex; 
                                                          
8
 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Final Report, (London: 
The Stationery Office, 2010), chapter 23, paras. 7 and 8. 
9
 HM Government, Lord Young, Common Sense, Common Safety (2010), 23. 
10
 CMO, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting Out Proposals for Reforming the Approach to 
Clinical Negligence in the NHS (London: Department of Health, 2003). 
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– it is unfair – apparently similar cases may reach different outcomes; 
– it is slow  ... ; 
– it is costly in legal fees; diversion of clinical staff time from clinical care; staff 
morale; and public confidence; 
– patients are dissatisfied with the lack of explanations and apologies or 
reassurance that action has been taken to prevent repetition; 
– it encourages defensiveness and secrecy and stands in the way of learning 
and improvement in the health service.11 
 
The CMO in Making Amends  recommended a fast track clinical negligence system 
which should address not only restoration, but also correction and communication. 
The report states: 
[A]n independent evaluation of a small claims pilot supported by the 
Department of Health and NHSLA found that even patients who receive 
compensation often remain dissatisfied if they do not also receive the 
explanations or apologies they seek or reassurance about the action taken to 
prevent repetition.12 
The NHS Redress Act 2006 was enacted. As we shall see, it fell short of the CMO’s 
recommendations.13 In England, secondary legislation to implement the scheme was 
delayed, ostensibly to allow new complaints procedures to embed. In 2009 the 
House of Commons Select Committee called for immediate implementation, claiming 
the failure to do so caused protracted delays for litigants, increased litigation costs to 
                                                          
11
 Ibid.,  p. 13. 
12
 Ibid., at 7.5 – 7.6. 
13
 A.-M. Farrell, S. Devaney, “Making Amends or Making Things Worse? Clinical Negligence Reform 
and Patient Redress in England” (2007) 27(4) Legal Studies 630. 
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the NHS,  encouraged defensiveness by NHS organisations, and hindered a safety 
culture.14 Measures addressing other aspects of the redress system made progress. 
The Government have not published plans to resurrect the NHS Redress scheme, 
but following the advice of Lord Young, instead launched a consultation proposing 
the extension of the Road Traffic Act scheme to cover low value clinical negligence 
claims.15  
2. A (PERECPTION OF) COMPENSATION CULTURE? 
 
Since Making Amends, claims and costs have risen further still.16 In 2006 the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee investigated whether the rise in litigation was a 
result of a ‘compensation culture’.17  They found little evidence that it was. A rise in 
claims does not necessarily correlate with a culture of compensation.18 However the 
Committee concluded that ‘there is ample evidence that risk aversion is becoming an 
insidious problem which the Government and the Health and Safety Executive must 
attempt to address’.19  Today, the Government sends out mixed messages,20 
vacillating between claims that we are in the midst of a compensation culture21 and 
                                                          
14
 House of Commons Select Committee Report on Patient Safety, (2009) section 4. 
15
 Solving Disputes in the County Courts, see note 4 above. 
16
 NHSLA, Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 (London, 2010). ‘£787 million was paid in connection 
with clinical negligence claims during 2009/10, up from £769 million in 2008/09.’ 
http://www.nhsla.com/home.htm. 
17
 Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of Session 2005-06 (London: 
The Stationary Office, 2006), HC 754-I, para. 111. 
18
 K. Oliphant, R. Lewis, A.  Morris, “Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is There A Compensation 
Culture In The United Kingdom?” (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158. 
19
 Ibid.  
20
 A. Morris, “‘Common Sense Common Safety’: The Compensation Culture Perspective” (2011) 27(2) 
Journal of Professional Negligence 82 at p.  83. 
21
 Common Sense, Common Safety, see note 9 above, Foreword: David Cameron: ‘A damaging 
compensation culture has arisen …’; Lord Young: ‘I believe that a ‘compensation culture’ driven by 
litigation is at the heart of the problems that so beset health and safety today.’ See also Solving 
Disputes in the County Courts see note 4 above, at p. 4: ‘A newer burden on the system is the move 
towards a compensation culture, driven by litigation’; and p. 6 recommending proposals to ‘challenge 
one of the roots of the developing compensation culture’. 
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the more reserved claim that there is a perception of a compensation culture.22 The 
Compensation Act 2006 attempted to reduce the litigious nature of society, not by 
changing the law of negligence,23 but by regulating the claims management industry.  
In 2010 Lord Young recommended further legislation to consolidate health and 
safety legislation24  and in 2011 the package of proposals to reform administration 
and justice and civil funding costs aim (in part) to produce ‘a shift that should start to 
challenge one of the roots of the developing compensation culture’.25  
The CMO emphasised both the financial implications of clinical negligence 
litigation and its damaging effects on both claimants (whose claims were dealt with 
too slowly and who frequently did not get the information or the form of redress they 
sought) and doctors (for whom litigation was stressful and damaging). Recession 
and financial crisis perpetuate the perception that the pendulum has swung too far in 
the direction of substantive justice at the expense of procedural justice. Cost cutting 
has become the primary goal. The ‘perception’ of a compensation culture makes this 
more palatable.  It emphasises the stifling effect a litigious society has on business 
and the fact that scarce NHS resources are diverted from patient care into the 
pockets of vexatious claimants and greedy solicitors. The difficulty is that whilst 
cutting the costs of clinical negligence litigation is a worthy goal, ignoring patient’s 
interests will result in damaged confidence in NHS redress and will ultimately 
necessitate further reform.  
                                                          
22
 Common Sense, Common Safety, see note 9 above, Foreword and at p. 11: the report refers to the 
‘belief that there is a nationwide compensation culture’; p. 19: the report recognises that ‘The problem 
of the compensation culture prevalent in society today is, however, one of perception rather than 
reality.’ 
23
 Uren v. Corporate Leisure Ltd [2010] EWHC 46 (QB), per Field J. at [19]. Note the Compensation 
Act 2006 (Amendment) Bill 2009-10 Bill 58 (to amend the s. 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 so as to 
apply a presumption that defendants engaged in a desirable activity satisfy the standard of care) was 
dropped after the first reading in February 2010. 
24
 Common Sense, Common Safety, see note 9 above. 
25
 Solving Disputes in the County Courts, see note 4 above, at p. 6. 
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3. HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?26 
 
We have seen that the CMO sought to address the problems inherent in clinical 
negligence litigation via a new tort based, fast track scheme. Since 2003, however, 
there have been a number of reforms designed to impact on NHS redress more 
generally. In this section I examine each of the CMO’s recommendations in order to 
assess how far the previous Administration’s NHS reforms coupled with the 
Government’s reform proposals relating to the NHS and to civil litigation cost reform 
address his requirements.  
 
–‘Making Amends’ recommended that: ‘the system of compensation is 
affordable and reasonably predictable in the way it operates’. … Any financial 
compensation is provided fairly and efficiently … Remedial treatment, care 
and rehabilitation are available to redress harm and injuries arising from 
healthcare 27 
 
The most recent statistics show a record number of claims and associated costs. 
The NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) reported in 2009/10 a 10 per cent increase in 
claims over 2008/9, which itself was an 11 per cent increase over 2007/8.28 Legal 
costs are high.29 Conditional Fee Arrangements were introduced by an amendment 
to the Courts and Legal Services Act in 1995. They resulted in high claimant costs 
which, in the NHSLA’s view, were frequently disproportionate to the damages paid 
                                                          
26
 These measures are analysed more fully in M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the 
Law 5th ed.  (Penguin: London, 2011 (forthcoming)), chapter 9. 
27
 Making Amends, see note 10 above, p. 13. 
28
 NHSLA, Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 (London, 2010), p. 13 
29
 NHSLA (website), Key Facts About Our Work,  ‘£769 million was paid in connection with clinical 
negligence claims during 2008/09, up from £633 million in 2007/08’ accessible at 
http://www.nhsla.com/home.htm. And see ‘Cost Warning over NHS Claims’ (2010) 4(1) Law Society 
Gazette 29. 
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out. These result in the NHSLA paying out considerably more on claimant costs than 
it does to fund defences.30   
The Government are keen to address rising costs, a problem which is 
particularly acute in medical litigation. An obvious solution is to limit the liability of the 
NHS,31   but can costs be rebalanced, without damaging access to justice? The 
Government, in Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 
2011,  are considering eliminating Legal Aid in a range of cases, including most 
clinical negligence cases,32 and replacing it with no-win-no-fee agreements.33  The 
Government seek to avoid contravention of Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights34 by setting up an ‘exceptional funding scheme’, promising that: 
[T]here may be particularly complex cases where […] it may be difficult to find 
a CFA, but the exceptional funding scheme for out of scope cases will ensure 
that individual cases of this type continue to receive legal aid.35 
Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill takes forward 
Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals in his Civil Litigation Costs Review.36 The Bill is an 
                                                          
30
 NHSLA Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 (London, 2010), p 14: ‘The costs claimed by claimant 
lawyers continue to be significantly higher than those incurred on our behalf by our panel defence 
solicitors. This remains a very significant concern for us and attracted significant coverage in the 
press during the year. The availability of Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) and the increase in their 
use by claimants in clinical claims has meant that claimants’ costs are often significantly 
disproportionate to the amount of damages paid, particularly in low-value claims.’  
31
 For example Part II of the Australian New South Wales Civil Liability Act 2002 reduced the number 
of and value of personal injury claims. For critique see T.A. Faunce, “Reducing Injustice From Recent 
Legislation Subsidising Insurance and Restricting Civil Liability” (2010) 15(5) Journal of Law and 
Medicine 729; Also Law Council of Australia, Tort Law Reform: Bringing Balance to Personal Injury 
Law (website) accessible at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/programs/national-policy/tort-law-
reform/tort-law-reform_home.cfm. 
32
 Ministry of Justice, Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales, Consultation Cm 
7967 (2010); Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Reform in England and Wales; the Government Response, 
Cm 8072, June 2011. 
33
 N. Hanman, “Legal Aid Cuts Put Access to Justice at Risk, Say Lawyers” The Guardian 17 August 
2010. 
34
 Bobrowski v Poland [2008] ECHR 64916/01; Bakan v Turkey 56547/00 [2002] ECHR 604. 
35
 Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Reform in England and Wales; the Government Response, Cm 8072, 
June 2011, para. 37. 
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enabling Bill and therefore lacks detail. The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 
say of it:  
Cutting legal aid for medical injuries at the same time as restricting ‘no win, no 
fee’ is a savage blow for patients whose lives may have been shattered by 
their injuries. … The drive to cut costs by forcing injured people to give up part 
of their compensation to pay legal fees is unfair, unjust and unwarranted. … 
People don’t choose to be injured, but when negligence happens, the guilty 
party – the losing defendant - must surely be held fully to account.37 
  
There are two strands to Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals, which have a far wider 
remit than clinical negligence. One is to assert more effective control over case and 
cost management. The aim would be to ensure that costs are proportional, even if 
this means that some cases do not go to trial. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 
particularly mediation, will play a more prominent role.38 Too many cases settle at a 
late stage, driving up costs. Lord Justice Jackson did not recommend that mediation 
is compulsory on the basis that it is not required in 95 per cent of cases personal 
injury cases.39 In the remaining 5 per cent: 
The outcomes which claimants typically seek in clinical negligence cases are: 
an apology; an explanation as to what happened; reassurance of reform ...; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
36
 Lord Justice Jackson,  see note 8 above. See Ministry of Justice, Proposals for Reform of Civil 
Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales CP 13/10, closed 14 February 2011. 
37
 Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL), Press Statement: Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Bill - Response from Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (June 2011). 
38
 Lord Justice Jackson,  see note 8 above, chapter 36. And see A. Brady, “Jackson Endorses the 
benefits of Mediation in the Legal Process in England and Wales” (2010) 76(2) Arbitration 251. 
39
 Lord Justice Jackson, ibid, chapter 36, para. 2.11. 
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and (occasionally) revenge in the form of regulatory intervention. ... These 
objectives are best achieved by mediation.40 
The second, in what might be seen as a step back to pre-1999 law, is  to make 
claimants under a CFA liable to pay their lawyer's success fee out of their damages, 
rather than being able to recover them (as at present) from the defendant.41  The 
level of general damages would be increased by 10 per cent to assist claimants, 
though it is not clear that this would always cover their costs, especially as insurance 
premiums are likely to rise. In February 2011 a report by an independent working 
group chaired by Professor Ken Oliphant condemned the proposals.42 The report 
argues that the evidential base relied on by Lord Justice Jackson is inadequate, 
leading to a misleading and biased picture. It labels the proposals:  
… inconsistent with a fundamental principle of civil justice – the principle of full 
compensation for wrongful injury – because they entail the ‘raiding’ of 
damages recovered by successful claimants to pay for their legal costs. They 
would be the beginning of a slippery slope towards ever greater inroads into 
the compensation to which injured persons are legally entitled.43  
The Government announced in June 2011 that where claimants must fund expert 
reports, the ATE insurance premium will remain recoverable.44 The Health 
                                                          
40
 Ibid, chapter 36, para. 2.14. 
41
 See criticism of the success fee regime in MGN Ltd v the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 39401/04 
and Pankhurst v White and MIB [2010] EWCA Civ 1445 where Jackson LJ said:  “I regret to say that I 
regard the arrangements made by the claimant’s solicitors in this case as grotesque. In addition to 
their base costs (ie their proper costs of conducting the litigation) they are extracting from the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau a ‘success fee’ of some £100,000 for running a risk which simply did not exist.”   
42
 Working Group on Civil Litigation Costs (chaired by Ken Oliphant), On a Slippery Slope - A 
Response to the Jackson Report (2011), accessible at http://ectil.org/oliphant/slippery-slope/. See 
also APIL Press Statement: Justice Bill a Savage Blow for Injured People, 29 June 2011. 
43
 Ibid., p i. See also R. Rothwell, ‘APIL Chief Urges Government to Give Road Traffic Act Portal a 
Change’ Law Society Gazette 24 February 2011, arguing that changes post-Jackson LJ’s report 
(specifically the RTA Portal introduced in 2010) ‘addressed Jackson’s concerns in 75% of all personal 
injury cases ‘at a stroke’, and would provide a ‘streamlined, fast-track’ process’. 
44
 Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations: The Government’s Response, see n 
5 above, para. 24. 
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Committee remains concerned. The retention of ATE insurance for clinical 
negligence claims combined with the end of recoverability of success fees from the 
defendant might reduce the compensation package for the most severely injured 
claimants:45  
The Committee considers that preservation of access to justice will be the 
yardstick by which these proposals will be judged by the public and that the 
Government must take care to gauge its proposals against this measure.46  
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice published a response to the consultation in 
March 201147 concluding:  
 
Taken as a whole, the package of measures will restore a much needed 
sense of proportion and fairness to the current regime – not by denying 
access to justice, but by restoring fair balance to the system. Defendants 
should benefit from more proportionate total legal expenses, with legal costs 
for the NHS falling by around a third.48 
In conclusion, the Government are acting on the CMO’s concern that clinical 
negligence litigation is neither affordable nor predictable, but, as we shall see, a 
number of measures proposed by the CMO to ensure that the system makes 
amends  to claimants have not been and are not being taken forward. Consequently, 
the proposed civil cost reforms will save the NHS money but the adverse impact on 
access to justice may be significant. 
 
                                                          
45
 Health Committee Sixth Report - Complaints and Litigation (June 2011), para. 179. 
46
 Ibid,  para. 180. 
47
 Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations: The Government’s Response, see n 
5 above. 
48
 Ibid, para. 33. 
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– ‘Making Amends’ recommended that: ‘risks of care are reduced and patient 
safety improves because medical errors and near misses are readily reported, 
successfully analysed and effective corrective action takes place and is 
sustained’;49 
Evidence suggests that defensiveness amongst the medical profession is a 
persistent problem,50 though the associated costs are difficult to quantify.51  The 
‘duty of candour’ is limited.52 The case of Colin Freeman53 demonstrates the problem 
well. Freeman suffered a stroke which might have been avoided had hospital staff 
made the correct diagnosis. When his wife complained, the hospital responded 
cautiously, refusing to admit any error. Investigation by a law firm led to a different 
conclusion and the Trust admitted liability. Sankey labels the Trust’s statement a 
‘misleading denial’ and calls for the NHS to tackle its ‘culture of denial’, and assert a 
legal duty of candour to patients. 54  The CMO recommended such a duty in Making 
Amends,55  and the House of Commons called for the duty to be reconsidered in 
2009.56  
The Department of Health has responded cautiously and disjointedly. It 
promised a culture of openness in High Quality Care for All.57 Section 2 of the 
                                                          
49
 Making Amends, see note 10 above, p. 13. 
50
 Department of Health, Safety First: A Report for Patients, Clinicians and Healthcare Managers 
(London, 2006); House of Commons Health Committee, Patient Safety – Sixth Report of Session 
2008-2009. (London: The Stationery Office, 2009) Volumes 1 and 2. 
51
 J. Taylor “NHS Compensation Culture: Do Patients Justice’ (2008) Nov 20 Health Services Journal 
20. 
52
 See Lee v South West Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 W.L.R. 845, CA “I personally 
think that in professional negligence cases, and in particular in medical negligence cases, there is a 
duty of candour resting on the professional man.” Per Donaldson MR. Also Treasury Solicitor’s 
Department, Guidance on Discharging the Duty of Candour and Disclosure in Judicial Review 
Proceedings (January 2010). 
53
 Discussed by P. Sankey, “Comment: A Patient’s Right to Know” (2010) 18 Mar Law Society 
Gazette, 10.  
54
 See also AvMA, Legal Duty of Candour (website) accessible at: 
http://www.avma.org.uk/pages/legal_duty_of_candour_-_robbies_law.html. 
55
 Making Amends see note 10 above, pp. 18 and 125. 
56
 House of Commons, Health Committee: Sixth Report (2009), para. 91. 
57
 Department of Health, High Quality Care for All Cm 7432 (2008), ch. 5, paras. 21-25. 
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Compensation Act 2006 reassures healthcare professionals (and others) that: ‘An 
apology, offer of treatment or other redress shall not of itself amount to an omission 
of negligence or breach of statutory duty.’ According to the National Patient Safety 
Agency: ‘Saying sorry is not an admission of liability and is the right thing to do. … 
Patients have a right to expect openness in their healthcare’;58 a stance enforced by 
the Care Quality Commission,59 the NHS Litigation Authority,60  and the General 
Medical Council (GMC)61.62 In April 2010 a statutory duty to report incidents was 
introduced.63 The NPSA will pass on details of incidents to the Care Quality 
Commission which can impose fines and registration penalties if the guidelines are 
not strictly followed.  
A more comprehensive approach was promised in the Department of Health’s 
White Paper Liberating the NHS, where the Government undertook to ‘require 
hospitals to be open about mistakes and always tell patients if something has gone 
wrong’.64 However, there is no logical reason to restrict the duty to hospitals. Primary 
carers too might be required to be candid. Furthermore, it is unclear how the 
Government intend to achieve this goal. Early day motions in 201065 proposed that 
the duty be put on a statutory footing, but the Government are keen to avoid new 
legislation and the resulting bureaucracy.66 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
                                                          
58
 NPSA, Being Open: Communicating Patient Safety Incidents with Patients, Their Families and 
Carers NPSA/2009/PSA003, (London: DH, 2009) p 6.  
59
 Care Quality Commission, A Quality Service, A Quality Experience (London: CQC, 2009). 
60
 National Health Service Litigation Authority, Apologies and Explanations: Letter to Chief Executives 
and Finance Directors (London, 2009). 
61
 GMC, Good Clinical Practice (2006), para. 30.  
62
 See J. Wright, G. Opperman, ‘The Disclosure of Medical Errors: A Catalyst for Litigation or the Way 
Forward for Better Patient Management?’ (2008) 14 Clinical Risk 193. 
63
 Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3112, Regulation 18. 
64
 White Paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS Cm 7881 (2010), p. 3. For critique see V. 
Shekar, M. Singh, K. Shekar, P. Brennan, “Clinical Negligence and Duty of Candour” British Journal 
of Oral and Maxilofacial Surgery (2010) advance on-line publication. 
65
 T. Brake, Campaign for a Statutory Duty of Candour in Healthcare EDM 1163, 23 March 2010; T. 
Brake Duty of Candour in Healthcare EDM 486, 13 July 2010. 
66
 D. West, “Lansley Against Legal Duty of Candour” Nursing Times 11 June 2010. 
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for Health, Anne Milton, outlined two additional options.67 The first is to utilise 
existing Care Quality Commission regulations to require healthcare organisations to 
show that they have been open.  But this might prove difficult to enforce in court. The 
second option is to require openness through new NHS contractual and 
commissioning processes. To this end, the Government recently promised to 
introduce a contractual duty of candour.68  It seems that if the Government are to 
make good their promise, the duty of candour is likely to be imposed incrementally, 
and will lack the emphasis and culture change of a statutory duty. The Health 
Committee argues that the proposals do not go far enough: they call for an additional 
contractual duty between providers and commissioners, and a duty from providers to 
patients as part of the terms for authorisation from Monitor or licence from the Care 
Quality Commission.69  
Requiring openness is only part of the solution. In addition it is necessary to 
create an environment whereby doctors are willing to admit their errors or mistakes, 
and to report those of others, whilst maintaining individual and institutional sanctions 
by which they can be held to account.70 The current clinical negligence system acts 
as a disincentive to openness.  The CMO recommended that a statutory duty of 
candour be accompanied by an exemption from disciplinary action, at least where no 
crime has been committed and it remains safe for the doctor to practise.71 In 
addition, documents identifying adverse events would be protected from disclosure 
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in court, as is the case in parts of Canada, Australia and the US.72 This does not 
seem to form part of the Government’s plans, yet without it the incentive for 
openness and honesty remains limited. 
 
– ‘Making Amends’ recommended that: ‘payments of compensation act as 
financial incentives on healthcare organisations and their staff to improve 
quality and patient safety’73; 
 
Somewhat predictably, the Government claim that the previous Administration took 
the wrong approach to improving quality and patient safety in the NHS. It increased 
the regulation of the healthcare profession74 with a raft of process-driven targets. The 
Government vow to change all that75 – to free the NHS from top-down bureaucracy. 
The Public Bodies Bill 2010 aims to reduce the number of arms-length bodies; the 
much maligned Health and Social Care Bill 2011 proposes the most far reaching 
reforms of the NHS yet – creating groups of GPs, Commissioning Consortia, who will 
commission the majority of services. New registration and licensing measures have 
already been introduced. 76 An independent healthcare regulator, the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC), produces outcome-based guidance,77  against which providers 
demonstrate their compliance. Failure can result in the imposition of a range of 
sanctions, including a fine of up to £50,000. 78 The CQC publish on their website the 
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registration status of Trusts, which are required to publish an annual Quality 
Account.79  The aim is to improve public accountability.  
There is much work to be done working out how to choose, define and 
measure outcomes,80 but they will include clinical outcomes, quality of life and 
crucially, patient perceptions of healthcare. To put it crudely, if providers do not 
satisfy patients, they are less likely to be chosen to provide care by the 
Commissioning Consortia, and will suffer financially as a result. There is therefore a 
financial incentive to improve quality. There is debate as to how statistics on 
compensation claims and complaints might be used. On one hand they represent 
patient dissatisfaction which should count against the provider. On the other hand, 
they might represent a healthy approach to information disclosure and a well 
signposted complaints process.  Care will need to be taken when publishing 
complaints statistics to qualify the type of complaints and ensure that providers who 
obstruct the path to restoration with a lack of openness or poor attitudes suffer the 
consequences. 
Professional regulation plays its part. Reforms (and reform proposals) of the 
GMC (introducing licenses to practice81 and, by 2012 revalidation82 and reforming 
fitness to practice proceedings83) have been well received.84  The fact that 
revalidation has been streamlined and watered down85 is not necessarily to be 
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lamented given the positive effect this might have on the confidence of doctors. 
Over-regulation and harsh sanctions are likely to leave doctors resentful and 
heighten secrecy when things go wrong.  
– ‘Making Amends’ recommended that: ‘different entry points to expressing 
complaints and concerns about standards of care are well co-ordinated and 
well understood by the public and healthcare professionals’.86 
 
Not only does an effective complaints process enable the NHS to learn from its 
mistakes, it also offers an alternative to litigation. 87  The NHS complaints 
procedure88 provides redress in the forms of communication, correction and 
potentially, sanction. Despite reforms in 199689 and 2004,90 patients still found the 
complaints process inflexible, the system complex and slow and the healthcare 
professionals defensive and closed.91 Reforms in 200992  simplify the law and align 
complaints procedures in relation to local authority social services and the NHS. 
‘Responsible bodies’ are required to publicise their complaints arrangements93  and 
to disclose information about complaints in annual reports.94 The NHS Constitution 
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reiterates the right to complain and pledges (in other words, promises to prioritise 
and develop in future):  
 when mistakes happen, to acknowledge them, apologise, explain what 
went wrong and put things right quickly and effectively; and  
 to ensure that the organisation learns lessons from complaints and 
claims and uses these to improve NHS services. 95  
 
The reforms aim to ensure that complaints are acted upon and dealt with swiftly, but 
the NHS Ombudsman reported in 2010 that the process is still poorly signposted and 
mistakes are being repeated.96  Some NHS staff adopt an inappropriate attitude to 
complainants. Explanations and apologies, which she reminds us are ‘simple to 
deliver and costing nothing’,97  are too infrequently offered. 98 The failures of the 
regulatory system to react quickly and effectively to appalling standards of care at 
Mid-Staffordshire99 have led to further questions about the adequacy of the 
complaints process. At a House of Commons Health Committee investigation100 the 
Health Service Ombudsman called for the Government to allow the 2009 reforms to 
embed before imposing additional changes on the system. The reforms will improve 
the sharing of information between complaints handlers (and HealthWatch in future) 
and regulators such as the CQC and Monitor. This in turn will enable systemic 
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investigations and change. The Health Committee agreed that the two stage process 
has strong potential101 but recommended that ‘clear national standards for 
complaints handling’102 are introduced; that ‘one organisation [HealthWatch England] 
should be responsible for maintaining an overview of complaints handling in the 
NHS’;103 and that providers are more transparent and accountable to their 
commissioners about the number of complaints they receive and how they are 
handled.104  
The 2009 reforms offer swifter resolution of complaints but this comes at a 
price. The second of what was previously a three-stage process has been removed. 
If the complainant is dissatisfied with local complaints resolution, he must take his 
complaint to the Health Services Ombudsman. The Ombudsman cannot look at 
them all.105 She will look for indications of service failure and individual injustice and 
take on only a small proportion of the complaints received. The Health Committee 
recommends a widening of the Ombudsman’s remit so that the Ombudsman is not 
limited to investigating cases where there will be a ‘worthwhile outcome’.106 Despite 
numerous reforms, the complaints process remains the subject of intense criticism. 
Underlying these problems is a persistent lack of openness amongst doctors when 
things go wrong.   
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– ‘Making Amends’ recommended that: ‘the process of compensation does 
not undermine the strength of the relationship between patient and healthcare 
professional’;107 
We have seen that the wider NHS Redress reforms go some way towards 
addressing the problems identified by the CMO, but that civil litigation cost reform 
alone offers only a partial solution. The clinical negligence system creates a vicious 
cycle whereby doctors fear openly admitting their errors which undermines those 
aspects of NHS Redress which aim to enhance correction and communication, 
which in turn causes some to turn to litigation.108 In a transparent, patient-led, 
outcome-driven NHS, improving access to justice for meritorious cases, reducing 
defensiveness and enhancing openness and learning are priorities which have 
proven impossible to achieve without addressing the inadequacies of clinical 
negligence. Keren-Paz observes that ‘filing a suit against a physician, and even 
more so finding her liable, are likely to generate reputation loss, which is greater than 
the loss which might be generated by the underlying event.’109 Furthermore, this 
produces an asymmetry insofar as it harms the doctor without any corresponding 
benefit to the claimant.110 The result is that doctors seek to settle, though this too 
involves some reputation loss, or fight the claim excessively and obstruct fact finding.  
In the next sections I examine three methods which might address some of these 
problems. None is perfect. 
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B. FILLING THE GAPS 
1. SCOTTISH NO FAULT COMPENSATION REVIEW GROUP 
 
Sir Ian Kennedy’s report on the Bristol Infirmary debacle argued that the culture of 
defensiveness within the NHS will persist as long as healthcare providers fear the 
stigma of settlement and litigation under the clinical negligence regime. He 
recommended: ‘an alternative system for compensating those patients who suffer 
harm arising out of treatment from the NHS’.111  
The term ‘no fault’ compensation has been used to cover a wide range of 
schemes, even those which rely on some element of fault. The independent charity, 
Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) recommends what it refers to as the 
‘avoidability test’.112 This is based on the CMO’s recommendations in Making 
Amends that a ‘broader definition of sub-standard care’ than Bolam test should be 
adopted in the redress scheme.113 The avoidability test would provide for 
compensation in all cases except those where the result was unavoidable.  
An alternative would be to reject the fault-based test for medical error as in 
New Zealand.114 In a ‘mutual NHS’ it is arguable that blame has no place. To replace 
medical negligence litigation, patients would be compensated for accidents (or even 
for ill-health), without the need to prove fault, through a central fund. The NHS 
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already provides free treatment, but the fund would give additional ‘top-up’ 
compensation, though not necessarily the equivalent compensation the patient 
would have received had he successfully pursued medical negligence litigation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that openness and honesty regarding medical errors in 
New Zealand is high.115 No fault scheme have worked in countries with a 
comprehensive social security system and high national insurance contributions, 
such as the Nordic countries, arguably because the ‘top-up’ involved is relatively 
small and therefore costs are manageable.116  
In Scotland, the No Fault Compensation Review Group chaired by Professor 
Sheila Mclean recommended that, in conjunction with improved social welfare 
provisions,  the Scottish Government implement a no fault system similar to that 
which operates in Sweden. 117 The Swedish scheme operates for medical accidents 
and patients retain a right to litigate where they fail in their no fault claim, and a right 
to apply under the scheme if their litigation fails. However, unlike the Swedish 
scheme, the proposed Scottish scheme would not be based on the ‘avoidability’ test, 
‘but rather on a clear description of which injuries are not eligible for compensation 
under the no fault scheme’.118 The Review Group assert that the scheme might 
prove cost effective in Scotland. The Scottish Government will now further analyse 
the proposals. If implemented, England might reconsider whether such a scheme 
poses a viable alternative to tort based schemes.119 There would be much to 
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recommend such an approach,120  but England’s size and the strains it would put on 
the NHS make this an unlikely option in the short to medium term.121  The Review 
Group recognised that a disadvantage of no fault schemes is ‘potential lack of 
affordability, particularly in the context of large national populations’.122 In part for this 
reason, English no fault schemes for medical accidents were rejected in 1978, 123 
1990,124 2003125and most recently by the Health Committee in 2011. The Health 
Committee, chaired by former health secretary Stephen Dorrell, argued that a no-
fault scheme would increase the costs of settling claims between 20 per cent and 80 
per cent; that the volume of cases would rise; and that the necessity to fix the ‘pot’ 
due to strains on NHS resources would mean that severely injured people would be 
worse off.126 This article emphasises potential policy directions and implications. I 
therefore restrict my coverage to tort based schemes whereby there is no right to 
compensation unless there is a breach of civil law. 
2. THE NHS REDRESS ACT 2006 
 
Lord Justice Jackson recommended that Regulations are implemented to set up a 
new redress scheme for England under the NHS Redress Act 2006. The scheme 
would be designed to act as an alternative to litigation. It would, at least for the first 
few years, relate only to claims relating to hospital services.127  Applicants would 
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need to show a ‘qualifying liability in tort’ (in other words, personal injury or 
negligence),128 and that they have not brought civil proceedings in court though they 
may later do so if they choose not to accept a settlement offered under the 
scheme.129 There is no right to appeal, though the applicant might choose to register 
a complaint about their care or the scheme.130 An aggrieved patient may claim under 
the scheme, or alternatively the process could be triggered by a healthcare provider 
or in the course of the investigation of a complaint.131 The scheme would provide for 
free legal advice132 and free reports from jointly instructed medical experts.133 In 
addition to the offer of compensation, ‘redress’ encompasses the giving of an 
explanation; an apology; and a report on the ‘action which has been, or will be, taken 
to prevent similar cases arising’.134 It is a mechanism by which different forms of 
redress might be delivered.  
The NHS Redress (Wales) Measure 2008 enabled Wales to develop a 
redress scheme which was introduced in the National Health Service (Concerns, 
Complaints and Redress Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2011. Parts came into 
force in April 2011, and the remainder will come into force in October. An optional 
fast track scheme (the ‘Speedy Resolution Scheme’) for low value claims (between 
£5,000 and £15,000) was implemented in Wales in 2005.135 In the short term at 
least, it will exist alongside the new redress scheme. The intention is to bring 
together a fragmented system136 under which complaints, claims and the reporting of 
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incidents were previously handled separately and inconsistently.  The aim is to 
respond to all ‘concerns’, including complaints, incidents and compensation claims in 
a consistent manner.137  In terms of ‘communication’ and ‘correction’, where a 
concern is raised,138 the responsible body will prepare a written response which will 
detail the investigation and potentially an apology; action taken or to be taken; 
reminder of the right to take the case to the Ombudsman; and an offer to discuss the 
report.139 The responsible body will generally have 30 days from the notification of 
the concern to achieve this. During this time, regulation 25 will require the 
responsible body to consider whether there is a ‘qualifying liability in tort’. If so, Part 
6 will apply. Within a period of 12 months, the responsible body may offer 
compensation (within the £25,000 limit); or a contract for care and treatment; an 
apology; an explanation; and a report on action taken to prevent recurrence of the 
event. If the offer is accepted, the complainant  waives the right to bring civil legal 
proceedings in respect of the issue. Regulation 31 requires the NHS Body to show 
how they will improve their services on the basis of the concerns raised. 
It will not be administered independently. The Association of Personal Injury 
Lawyers has expressed concern that the NHS in Wales will be ‘judge and jury’ of its 
own blunders’.140 The Welsh model will have significant workload implications for the 
Health Boards which are intended to administer the scheme. In terms of the 
coverage of the scheme, the Welsh scheme was originally to have a considerably 
wider remit than the previously proposed English equivalent, covering primary care 
as well as hospital based serviced. However objections resulted in a more limited 
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scheme which does not apply to GPs or independent providers when they are not 
NHS indemnified.  
In England the Act was less well received. The Committee for Constitutional 
Affairs warned that the NHS Redress Bill was ill-thought out and called for a pilot 
scheme:  
 
[T]he Government has ... not satisfied us that it has successfully engaged 
with practitioners (both medical and legal) to ensure that the scheme will 
work. It is not apparent how cost effective the scheme will be, and there has 
been no reliable evidence of the likely cost of claims which would not have 
been pursued if the scheme had not been set up.141 
 
Nor were these issues resolved in the parliamentary process. The legislation is 
broadly framed, and the details of the scheme would be contained in secondary 
legislation. The resulting Act was much criticised for its limited scope. Farrell and 
Devaney142 feared that it would not constitute a just redress system, which they 
define as one which emphasises access to justice, the principles highlighted by the 
CMO in Making Amends, accountability and independence.143 Farrell and Devaney 
point out: 
 
Under the redress scheme, … both fact- and fault-finding will be managed and 
controlled by the NHS, thus enabling it essentially to act as judge and jury of its 
own (negligent) mistakes. It is hardly a situation likely to engender patient 
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confidence that the redress scheme is to be administered in a fair and impartial 
manner.144 
The merging of various ‘concerns’ proposed in the Welsh scheme would be 
considerably harder to achieve in the NHS in England due to its relative size and 
complexity. In any event, there are advantages to retaining some delineation 
between the processes surrounding incidents, complaints and claims, provided the 
various bodies communicate with each other and the applicant is clear as to which 
body he should direct his concern. One possible problem ensuing from merging the 
various systems may be that complainants expect compensation.  
Farrell and Devaney list the various points of departure from the 
recommendations made in Making Amends.145 There is no separate, no fault 
scheme for neurologically impaired babies (where claims are usually over the 
£20,000 threshold likely to be adopted if the scheme is implemented),146 there is no 
‘duty of candour’ to encourage openness;147 information relating to adverse events 
will not be protected from disclosure in court; and the NHSLA rather than the 
independent body recommended by the CMO would run the scheme.148 Perhaps the 
biggest drawback of the scheme is its cost. Fenn, Gray and Rickman estimated that 
the scheme would cost in the region of £42m per year.149   
The then Health Minister, Jane Kennedy said of the Bill in 2005, ‘The NHS 
Redress Bill means fairness for patients, not fees for lawyers. It is an important step 
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in preventing a US-style litigation culture.’150 The emphasis of the CMO’s report is on 
balancing procedural and substantive justice. The NHS Redress Act, on the other 
hand, prioritises cutting costs. We now have an alternate means of avoiding the 
much talked-about but little proved compensation culture – Lord Justice Jackson’s 
civil cost reforms. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that initiation stalled. 
3. EXTENDING THE RTA PI SCHEME 
 
The Government may yet follow Lord Justice Jackson’s advice and implement an 
NHS Redress scheme. However, an alternative has been suggested: implement a 
voluntary fast track personal injury system for clinical negligence claims under the 
recently adopted Road Traffic Act PI scheme.151 
The RTA PI scheme hails from a Ministry of Justice report in 2007 which 
recommended retention of the small claims limit of £1000, and a new low value 
claims process for personal injury claims up to £10,000.152 This was eventually taken 
forward for RTA PI claims only. Clinical negligence was excluded, partly because the 
NHS Redress Act 2006 would cover such claims, but also because clinical 
negligence is frequently more complex than most RTA claims.153 The RTA PI 
scheme had teething problems relating to the on-line system, and has had little time 
to embed. Nevertheless, Lord Young argues for its extension to clinical negligence 
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claims and a higher limit of £25,000. 154 A public consultation was launched in 
2011.155 
The RTA PI scheme has three stages, each with fixed costs and deadlines.156 
 Stage 1 – the claimant solicitor completes the claim notification form and send 
it to the insurer who may admit/deny liability.  
 Stage 2 – if liability is admitted, the claimant obtains a medical report and the 
process continues with offers and negotiation of a settlement to a strict 
timetable.  
 Stage 3 – where the parties cannot agree a settlement an application is made 
to court for a quantum hearing.157  
We have seen that the NHS Redress scheme might be costly to implement and 
operate. Extension of the RTA PI Scheme would not involve primary legislation and 
Lord Young argues that the scheme poses advantages over the NHS Redress 
scheme in terms of costs:   
Lower value claims (£1–£25,000) under the NHSLA’s largest scheme have an 
average settlement time of just over six months, although around 4 per cent of 
cases received by the NHSLA go to court. Total legal costs incurred in 
connection with NHSLA clinical claims closed in 2009/10 amounted to £163.7 
million. To my mind, the current system is too costly, and it takes far too long 
for some medical negligence cases to be resolved. Unfortunately, the 
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adoption of the Jackson proposals will not in itself substantially shorten the 
process.158 
Application of the scheme to clinical negligence claims is likely to reduce delay, 
simplify the process and thereby reduce costs for low value uncontested claims. 
Where liability is admitted, damage to the defendant’s reputation would be 
controlled, but where the facts are disputed, the option of proceeding to litigation 
remains. The scheme is user friendly and enables transfer of electronic data via a 
web-portal rather than the costly, slow and laborious paper-based methods 
traditionally used. It offers opportunity for communication and correction.  
 Lord Young was critical of the NHS Redress Act which, as we have seen, 
would have allowed a panel of experts (overseen by the NHSLA) rather than 
independent lawyers to determine the appropriate level of compensation, resulting in 
potential criticisms of impartiality or unfairness. Extension of the RTA PI Scheme 
might avoid these pitfalls. 159 If we return again to the CMO’s criticism of the clinical 
negligence system in 2003, 160 it seems that Lord Young’s scheme might address the 
complexity, unfairness and speed of low value clinical negligence claims, while Lord 
Justice Jackson’s proposals address their cost. Like the NHS Redress scheme, it 
would be non adversarial, and therefore likely to enhance openness.   
 One difficulty is that the RTA PI scheme is designed to deal with relatively 
simple cases. Breach and causation are significantly harder to determine in clinical 
negligence and this can result in delay and make fixed costs unwieldy. The scheme’s 
funding arrangements would have to change and the source of funding is unclear. 
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The RTA PI scheme is currently funded by the insurance industry.  The Government 
welcomed Lord Young’s report, but Lord Young is no longer available to champion 
the proposals having resigned in November 2010 over a gaffe concerning the 
recession. Instead the NHSLA is setting up a pilot,161 likely to run from April 2012. 
However, the NHSLA covers only a proportion of the clinical negligence scheme. At 
best its success will provide impetus to extend the scheme more widely. The 
Government’s consultation states that, if successful, the scheme might also be rolled 
out to capture claims against those not employed by a Trust, such as GPs and 
dentists,162 but there are significant variations between claims brought against NHS 
trusts and claims against individuals. The pilot would not be readily transferrable. 
The Medical Defence Union calls for caution.163 They propose a lengthy trial period 
by the NHSLA before any scheme is rolled out and question whether individual 
doctors would receive protections equal to claimants. Would they share the right to 
opt out of the scheme?  How would their reputation be protected given that mere 
involvement in a claim, no matter its outcome, can have negative connotations? 
Many clinical negligence cases settle on the basis that the risk of litigation is high, 
not on the basis of admission of guilt. Lord Justice Jackson was also cautious in his 
appraisal of the RTA PI scheme. He called for monitoring to ensure that costs do not 
spiral due to ‘satellite litigation’164  and avoidance behaviour. The aim is a simplified 
process but Lord Justice Jackson lamented the fact that lengthy and unwieldy rules 
now accompany the simplest category of litigation.165 Lord Justice Jackson’s report 
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was published before the RTA scheme as rolled out. He had another mechanism for 
dealing with clinical negligence at his fingertips – the NHS Redress Act – and it was 
this he recommended. 
C. CONCLUSION 
 
Clinical negligence is an integral part of NHS redress which in turn is high on the 
political agenda. The Government proposes wide scale reforms of civil litigation 
costs and administration and this article has assessed those proposals against the 
wider goals of NHS redress. The first part of this paper considered how far recent 
reforms satisfied the requirements of a just redress system put forward by the CMO 
in 2003. We have seen that reforms of the NHS since 2003 have addressed faults in 
the complaints system, professional regulation, institutional regulation and the duty 
of candour. Taken in conjunction with the proposed reforms of civil costs, do they 
address the faults in the redress system as perceived by the CMO?  We have 
argued that significant gaps remain and that these will be exacerbated if the reform 
proposals of civil litigation costs and legal aid are accepted. A stumbling block is the 
adversarial clinical negligence system which limits the openness of doctors which in 
turn limits the effectiveness of measures designed to improve communication, 
correction and sanction. I have much sympathy for the calls for a move to no fault 
compensation but this paper seeks to address policy options and implications and a 
no fault scheme for England has been ruled out, largely on the basis of cost. Two 
fast track low value tort based schemes have been proposed which I considered in 
the second part of the paper.  
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The NHS Redress Scheme was much criticised. Whilst it would reduce the 
adversarial nature of low value claims, it would be run by the NHSLA and would not 
address the lack of openness amongst healthcare professionals when things go 
wrong. The previous Administration delayed its implementation but Lord Justice 
Jackson called for its resurrection.  
Lord Young pointed out problems with the proposed scheme which he felt 
would still take too long to resolve claims. Others, we have seen, have argued that it 
focused too heavily on cost cutting and not enough on access to justice and 
impartiality. It did not satisfy the requirements of a just redress system recommended 
by the CMO. A new method of cost cutting  - civil litigation cost and administrative 
reform  - has been recommended by Lord Justice Jackson and has received 
Governmental support. Lord Young’s proposed alternative fast track scheme low 
value clinical negligence based on an extension of the RTA PI scheme still reflects 
monetary goals (affordability and speed) over access to justice.  In claims against 
NHS Trusts, ADR might enhance correction and communication and improve 
openness but we have seen that if it is extended to individual practitioners it might 
have the opposite effect. The CMO’s  recommendation that a fast track, tort based 
scheme should encourage practitioners to be open and honest, and ensure that  ‘the 
process of compensation does not undermine the strength of the relationship 
between patient and healthcare professional’ depends on wider NHS redress reform 
– improvements in complaints, professional regulation, institutional regulation and 
the duty of candour.   
The necessity to ensure that redress is ‘joined-up’ is receiving inadequate 
attention. In this time of austerity measures, the focus is naturally on cutting costs, 
but losing sight of adequate access to justice will itself prove costly.  Advances made 
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in relation to the complaints process and professional regulation are limited by the 
adverse effects clinical negligence has on the doctor patient relationship. Where 
financial compensation is barred by virtue of limitations on legal aid and civil law 
reform, more pressure will be placed on the complaints system and professional 
regulation to deliver appropriate sanction, communication and correction. If Scotland 
adopt a no fault system and the redress scheme in Wales proves effective, the 
dichotomy in access to justice will be sorely felt. The CMO recommended a 
comprehensive package of reforms to effect a culture change in the NHS. The 
Government are steering an altogether steadier course, prioritising the reduction of 
costs to the NHS. A low value, fast track scheme would reduce costs but a failure to 
serve the interests of patients will result in a lack of confidence not merely in the 
process of restoration, but in other aspects of NHS redress.  
